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Abstract
In this paper, we used the theory of bilateral market 
analysing the pricing model platform and influencing 
factors for game operators .we pointed out that the 
game operating platform has the typical characteristics 
of the bilateral market, showing a significant positive 
network externalities. Through the establishment of the 
pricing model of the game operating platform under the 
monopoly and competition cases, the article analysed its’ 
pricing issues, and we got that the game developers and 
players’ price elasticity of demand, the size of the user's 
network externalities from the other side, the market 
competition of game operations, the game operating 
platform’s bilateral costs to provide products or services 
and competitive operating platform’s degree of difference 
in providing products or services are the major factors in 
the game operating platform pricing.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of online games is causing 
concern of society, according to the 2008 China Game 
Industry Annual Conference issued the “2008 China 
Game Industry Report Summary” shows that in 2008 
China’s online games users has reached 4936 million, the 
actual market sales revenue reached 18.38 billion yuan, 
an increase over 76.6% to the same period 2007 (China 
Game Industry Report Summary, 2008). International 
Data Corporation (IDC) predicts that by 2012 China’s 
online game revenue will reach 26.23 billion yuan, 2007-
2012 compound annual growth rate will reach 19.9%, the 
online game industry is considered a sunrise industry with 
unlimited potential. This mainly relies on the network, 
IT technology’s new industry exactly how to run how to 
price in the market, how to value distribution, that is not 
only management need to understand, but also important 
for the online games value chain participants to achieve 
multi- self-value, and is the basic approach for achieving 
the effective value chain management. In this paper, 
we use the hot spots in recent years—bilateral market 
to analyze the economic attributes of game operating 
platform. Through the optimal pricing analysis online 
game operating platform under monopoly and competition 
cases, we have got the main factors affecting the pricing 
of operating platform, and provide a unique perspective 
for the analysis of pricing in online game industry market 
and competitive equilibrium theory.
1.  THE BILATERAL MARKET OF GAME 
OPERATING PLATFORM
After a decade of development, the network game market 
chain has been formed, as shown in Figure 1. Developer 
is in the upstream of the industry chain, which is mainly 
responsible for R&D production and the operation 
of online games after commissioning; Operators is 
mainly for providing hardware, bandwidth, platform 
maintenance, customer service and other services; 
Channel plays as a game operator’ market seller role, it 
is responsible for the online game software, point card 
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and other sales. Operational support provided for the 
game operators to provide network operators, broadband, 
equipment, or regional games area, internet area and 
other services. The major domestic carries support of 
the business are: (1) telecom and ISP; (2) IDC; (3) ICP; 
(4) other IT companies: including PC vendors, server 
vendors, system security vendors, software vendors and 
other platform.
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Figure 1 
Online Game Industry Chain
It can be seen that in the network game industry game 
operators is the leading value-added, in some sense, the 
game channel and business operators’ operational support 
are playing a marketing and technical support role. From the 
perspective of industry chain, the game operating platform is 
in the middle and has the following two characteristics:
1.1  Typical Operating Platform Game of the 
Bilateral Marke 
The typical bilateral market involves buyer, seller 
and third parties (platform). Shown in Figure 1, 
for the game industry, there is the bilateral market 
structure involving game developer (seller), the player 
(buyer) and the game operators (game operating), in 
which game operating platform is the core to achieve 
transaction.Among them, the developers and players 
as two types of users for the game operating platform, 
have the relationship of needing each other. That is 
developers need players’ concern as much as possible, 
and gamers want to see the game alternative as much 
as possible. Therefore to convince the buyer using a 
platform ,it must convince the seller, and make them 
believe that there will be buyers in the market, and vice 
verse (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003).
1.2  Network Externalities Between Bilateral of 
Game Operating Platform
Game operating platform as the typical bilateral market 
has significant externalities, such external nature 
performance is: positive externalities between bilateral 
members. That is the number of one side’s users increases 
with the number of other side users. In the actual 
operations’ performance, the more game developers 
join into the platform, it is more likely to attract players, 
then there will be more developers willing to carry out 
transactions through the platform.
2 .   P R I C I N G  M O D E L  O F  G A M E 
OPERATING PLATFORM
2.1  Basic Assumptions
First, when both sides have at least one common platform, 
the deal will happen. That is there is at least one platform 
on which both sides are willing to transact.
Second, economic value comes from the end user 
pairs buyer (denote as b) and seller (denote as S),such 
transactions are coordinated through the platform, the unit 
marginal cost of transactions of the platform are recorded 
as c≥0. And the cost of operating platform provided 
services to game developers and players were FS and Fb, 
where FS=cSNS and Fb=cbNb.
Third, buyers and sellers are heterogeneous, that 
is their benefits from the transaction increasing with 
the number of both sides participants and it is private 
information. When they traded through the platform i, 
the buyer’s utility is denoted by Ui
b, the seller’s utility is 
denoted by Ui
S ,and both of them are linear distribution.
Four, game operating platform charged PS and Pb for their 
services or products provided to developers and players.
Five, the externalities of unit play (game developer) 
access to the platform brings to game developer (play) 
denoted by aS (ab).
Six, the number of each side access to the platform 
denoted as NS and Nb, and NS=ФS(U
S), Nb=Фb(U
b), in 
which ФS(.) and Фb(.) is increasing function, that is the 
number of each side accessing to the platform increasing 
with its’ utility.
2.2  Platform Monopoly Pricing Model
Monopoly pricing is that only one game operating 
platform in the market, all the game developers and 
players can only trade through this platform. Although 
such extreme situations occur in the real market is 
difficultly, but in the perspective of the economic analysis 
paradigm, this is the starting point for other analysis. This 
article also start to analyze the situation of monopoly.
From the assumptions above, S is on behalf of game 
developers, b is on behalf of player, while there have NS 
game developer and Nb game player. For the network 
externalities between game developer and player, the 
utility of both parties is relative to their number, then 
under the monopoly platform, developers and players’ 
utility function are:
 US=aS (Nb–PS), U
b=ab (NS–Pb) (1)
As the game operating platform’s positive network 
externalities, there are aS>0, ab>0.
The profit function of game operating platform is:
∏= NS (PS–FS) +Nb (Pb–Fb)
by the formula (1) we can get PS=aSNb–U
S, Pb=abNS–
Ub, also by the assumption (6) we can get NS=ФS(U
S), 
Nb=Фb(U
b), put them into the operating platform’s profit 
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function, ∏ can be expressed as a function of US and Ub:
 ∏(US, Ub)=ФS(U
S) [aSФb(U
b)–US
 –FS]+Фb(U
b) [abФS(U
S) –Ub–Fb] 
(2)
From the conditions that the platform get the max 
profit is that the partial derivatives of ∏ to US and Ub are 
zero, we can get:
 US=(aS+ab)Фb(U
b) – FS –
ФS (U
S)
ФS' (U
S)
 ,
 Ub=(aS+ab)ФS(U
S) – Fb –
Фb (U
b)
Фb' (U
b)
That is :
 US=(aS+ab)Nb – FS –
ФS (U
S)
ФS' (U
S)
 ,
 Ub=(aS+ab)NS – Fb –
Фb (U
b)
Фb' (U
b)
 (3)
According to (1) and (3), the monopoly game 
operating platform’s maximizing price structure is:
 PS=FS –abNb+
ФS (U
S)
ФS' (U
S)
 Pb=Fb –aSNS+
Фb (U
b)
Фb' (U
b)
 (4)
We can see that compared with single market profit-
maximizing monopoly price, the pricing of the monopoly 
game operating platform to game developer(player) must to 
versus externalities abNb (aSNS) which is coming from the 
relative side to player(game developer). That is as a bilateral 
market, the monopoly game operating platform’s pricing 
for game developer and player ought to not only consider 
the demand price elasticity of both side and the cost for 
providing service for them, but also take the bilateral network 
externality issues into account. If the player’s demand price 
elasticity brings to the game developer externalities ab is 
large enough, the platform may charge the player below cost 
or even zero prices or negative prices.
2.3  Platform Competitive Pricing Model
The so-called competitive pricing model means the price 
structure from which platform can get maximize profits 
when there is competition. For simplicity, in this paper 
we only consider the existence of two game operating 
platform (i=1, 2) participating in market competition. 
We use Ui
S(Ui
b) to denote the utility of game developer 
(play) getting access to platform. Accordingly, the 
platform charge PiS and P
i
b for game developer and player 
respectively. If player and developer are multi-homing 
(that is both accessing to two platform), then the operating 
platform for trading is uncertainty. To simplify the model, 
we assume that game developer and player are single-
homing, that is they can only choose one platform to trade. 
The utility function for developer and player accessing to 
platform can be expressed as:
 Ui
S=aSN
i
b – P
i
S, Ui
b=abN
i
S – P
i
b (i=1,2) (5)
In which NiS and N
i
b respectively denoted the number 
of game developer and player joining to the platform. 
Using Hotelling price competition model to study the 
competition between game operating platform, and 
assuming ds and db (ds, db>0) respectively denote the 
different parameters for the service that the platform 
provided to developer and player, and then assumed that 
the different parameters and game developer and player’s 
distance to game operating platform is the cost’s affecting 
factor for developer and player accessing to platform. 
Then according to the Hotelling competition model, if a 
game developer in the x– distance access the platform’s 
utility is indifference, that can be expressed as:
aS N
i
b – P
i
S – ds x– =aSN
j
b – P
j
S – ds(1 – x–)  (i,j=1, 2且i≠j)
So 
x–=       +
1 aSN
i
b – P
i
S – (aSN
j
b – P
j
S)
2 2ds
 (6)
Also
NiS=p(x≤ x )=x =       +
1 aSN
i
b – P
i
S – (aSN
j
b – P
j
S)
2 2ds
As game developer can choose only one game operating 
platform to access, that is Njb=1 – N
i
b, so there is:
NiS=       +
1 aS(2N
i
b – 1) – (P
i
S  – P
j
S)
2 2ds
 (7)
Similarly available:
Nib=       +
1 ab(2N
i
S – 1) – (P
i
b  – P
j
b)
2 2db
 (8)
by (7) we can obtain that an additional audience access 
each platform i, the platform can attract aS/ds game developer 
jointing into platform, as the same reason from (8) we can 
obtain that additional game developer access each platform 
i, the platform can attract ab/db player jointing into the 
platform. Take equations (7) and (8) together we can see:
NiS=       +
1
2
1
2
aS(P
j
b – P
i
b) + db(P
j
S  – P
i
S)
ds db–aS ab
Nib=       +
1
2
1
2
ab(P
j
S – P
i
S) + dS(P
j
b  – P
i
b)
ds db–aS ab
Substitute the NiS and N
i
b into the game operating 
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platform i’s profit function ∏= NiS (P
i
S – FS)+N
i
b (P
i
b – 
Fb), so as to the same basis on the conditions for profit 
maximization, find PiS  and P
i
b’s first-order partial derivative, 
and let it to be zero, according to the Hotelling competition 
model’s final result of the competition balance, that is 
P1S=P
2
S, P
1
b=P
2
b, N
1
S=N
2
S=1/2, N
1
b=N
2
b=1/2, it can be drawn 
from the competitive that game operating platform for game 
developer and player are priced at:
PS=FS+dS – ab, Pb=Fb+db – aS (9)
From (9) we can see that competitive game operating 
platform’s pricing for game developer and player have 
to consider the cost of providing service to both sides, it 
also have to consider the differences degree and network 
externalities between two-sided consumers, and also 
other factors. If competitive game operating platform 
1 increase one side consumer’s price, it will be likely 
encourage the consumer change to platform 2, and the 
network externalities between game developer and 
player will affect the other side consumer’s transition. 
As a competitive game operating platform market, each 
platform on bilateral market prices’ plus capacity is 
restricted. Therefore, relative to the monopoly platform, 
the competitive platform’s ability of market plus is 
weaker, correspondingly the price will be lower.
3.  THE MAIN AFFECTING FACTORS FOR 
GAME OPERATING PLATFORM PRICING
based on the above two models’ analysis, we know that 
game operating platform’s price level and price structure 
is affected by many factors, which is mainly include: the 
cost of providing services (products), the price elasticity 
of demand for each side, the size of network externalities 
created by the relative edge, the number of consumers 
on each side and the services’ (products’) degree of 
differentiation provided by the platform.
3.1  The Cost of Service (Product)
Whether monopolistic or competitive operating platform 
game platform, they must take the cost for providing 
service or product to game developer and player into their 
pricing account. The cost of operating platform mainly 
include: hardware, broadband and other equipment costs, 
platform services, customer service and other service 
costs, personal costs, the cost of the channel and other 
agent agents. Most of these costs are for game software 
developers, therefore from the point of cost view, the 
pricing of the platform for game developer is generally 
higher than their pricing for the players.
3.2  The  Demand Elasticity for Both Accessing 
Platforms’ Sides 
The elasticity of demand on both sides is an important 
determinant of the game operating platform’ service 
pricing. Armstrong (2006) believe that a given size of 
the market is an affecting factor for the other’s demand 
elasticity, So the number of buyers on the incumbent 
increases, the platform charges the buyer will naturally 
increase, and the charge for the seller will decline; 
attractive seller can obtain a higher indirect benefits 
through the increasing number of buyer. 
However, no matter how the game operating platform 
is pricing, as long as there is no demand of the platform’s 
one side, then the other side’s demand will disappear. This 
requires operating platform try to convene the bilateral 
users to deal on the platform. In the process of convening, 
platform’s pricing structure is the key factor. Which in 
the real economy the common approach is to get buyer’s 
(player’s) large number of users through the open game 
beta, let them play games for free, or even pay for their 
platform access, such as giving the game equipment, to 
encourage the enthusiasm of benefit side involving in the 
platform, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) called such strategy 
as “divide and conquer”. Trough this strategy, the game 
operating platform can cultivate one or both user, to 
achieve successful operation of the platform.
3.3  Network Externalities Created by the Relative Side
If one of the platform’s two side can create significant 
externalities for the other, generally positive externality, 
then by lowering the price of one side will not only attract 
more same edge customers, but also can attract more 
consumers of other side to joint into the platform. 
3.4  The Number of Relative Consumers
Derived from the monopoly model of the final results we can 
see, the pricing of the platform for one side is affected by the 
number of the other side’s consumer. In the bilateral market 
environment, price and quantity are endogenous variables, 
and they are determined mutually. Therefore the distribution 
of price structure between the bilateral parties is the dynamic 
interaction with the number of relative consumers. Studying 
the decision role of price on number one-way static, and 
ignoring the inverse dynamic role of consumer’s number or 
the volume of distribution on price distribution will lead to 
unreasonable conclusions in bilateral market.   
3.5  The Degree of Difference on Platform’s 
Products (Services)
In a competitive bilateral market environment, platform 
pricing also need to concern the different products or 
services which alternative competitive game operating 
platform provided to game developer and player, that is 
the alienation degree of platforms’ product. The different 
degree of products or services provided by the platform will 
affect developer and player’s decision-making for accessing 
platform or not, which also affect the number of consumers 
on both sides, and ultimately it will affect the pricing of the 
platform. In a competitive environment, compared with other 
platforms if the platform a higher degree of differentiation for 
their products or services, the platform will have relatively 
greater market power, the plus of price from platform on 
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game developer and player will be higher. If the degree of 
difference about platform for developer (player) is small, it 
will lead to more intense competition between platforms. 
In order to achieve scale on both sides, it could eventually 
lead to the price decline on this side, or even lead to the price 
decline of the other side.   
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
(1)  Conclusions
In this paper, we use bilateral market theory to study the 
game operating platform’s pricing model and its’ pricing 
factors, in hoping of providing a new theoretical research 
perspective for game industry. by building pricing 
models of platform in monopoly and competitive case, 
we have analysed the way of the game operating platform 
pricing and the affecting factors of its’ price structure 
determination, and got the following conclusions:
First, to achieve profit maximization of operating 
platform, the game operating platform ought to not 
only consider the over all price level (price level) that it 
charged from game developer (seller) and player (buyer), 
what is more important is to consider the price distribution 
(price structure) between developer and player.
Second, the pricing of game operating platform to 
developer (player) should not only consider the cost of 
providing products or services for this side and the need 
of consumers, what is more important is to consider the 
network externalities issues between developer and player.
Third, the pricing factors of game operating platform 
mainly including: the market competition situation of 
game operating platform, the cost of products or services 
provided from platform to game developer and player, 
the price elasticity of demand from game developer and 
player respectively, the size of the network externalities 
of game developer (player) to player (game developer) 
, the number of platform’s two side and the degree of 
difference for products or services provided by the 
platform in competitive market environment.
Four,  Compared with  the s ingle  market ,  the 
phenomenon of cross-subsidies (usually game developer 
subsidy player) between game developer and player 
in game operating platform is the normal pricing 
phenomenon in operating platform. The reason for this 
cross-subsidy occurs is that the game operating platform 
want to solve the “Chicken and egg” problem. 
(2)  Outlook
This article just analyzed the game operating platform’s 
pricing problem in the case of monopoly and competition, 
and have not involved the impact of platform’s pricing 
methods on its pricing. For convenience, we assumed 
both sides of the platform is single-homing in our study 
of competitive game operating platform. In order to study 
the actual operating conditions wider, we need to put our 
effort to the following aspects:
F i rs t ,  expand the  compet i t ive  envi ronment . 
Monopoly and competition are just two extreme cases, 
and competitive markets can also be subdivided into 
oligopoly, duopoly, monopolistic competition and 
perfect competition. As for game industry, its market 
concentration is relatively high, its pricing analysis can be 
extended to the case of monopolistic competition, and that 
will be more close to the current status of the industry.
Second, the research of multi-homing consumers’ 
access into platform. From the realistic point of view, 
the seller (game developer) behaved single-homing trend 
in game operating platform, in general game developer 
tends to joint into single platform, but for buyer (player) 
side it showed strong multi-homing trend. Its specific 
performance is the player have the trend of selecting 
several games preference. So the model of seller single-
homing and buyer multi-homing can explain the actual 
characteristics of game industry more appropriately.
Third, from the point of current view for game operating 
platform, the platform often charge the seller a one-time 
accessing fees (registration fees), while charging the buyer in 
the form of time fees (transaction fees). Therefor in the game 
operating platform, charging one side a registration fee while 
charging the other side the transaction fee, this pricing model 
is the more practical operating way.
Four, there is an urgent need to strengthen empirical 
research. In the point of current study path view, the study 
of platform’s pricing model is still in the theoretical stage, 
and it is also need carefully consider about the extent of the 
theoretical model based on rigorous assumption to explain 
the practical problems. Therefore basing on actual data and 
verification of the theoretical model is the direction for the 
platform’s corporate behavior strategy research.
Five, expand competitive strategy study for game 
industry. For game operating platform, pricing is just one 
way of platform’s competition strategy. For platform the key 
to success is how to attract as many consumers as possible 
to trade on the platform in the bilateral market environment, 
usually platform can take vertical differentiation, bundling, 
interoperability and other ways to solve the problem, which 
involves platform competitive strategy in two-sided market 
environment. Therefore I believe taking the pricing strategy 
of platform enterprise as a starting point for studying the 
platform’s strategic behavior extensively is the fundamental 
to guide business’ practices.
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